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Milne: New Freedom for Employer Communications

NEW FREEDOM FOR EMPLOYER
COMMUNICATIONS
by Cynthia Milne*
Sections 8(c)1 and 72 of the National Labor Relations Act ("the
Act") provide the employer's right to communicate with employees
regarding unionization and the collective bargaining agreement, and

the statutory schemes governing company and employee relations.
Three recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board3 indicate that the Board's current position regarding employer communications to employees in the workplace will permit a more frank exchange of views, opinions and information than has been permitted
in the past.4 Some areas of employer speech, however, remain restricted, reflecting the tension which has historically existed between
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas; B.A. University of Texas at Austin; M.A.,
University of Wisconsin - Madison; J.D., University of Texas Law School.
1. Section 8(c) provides as follows:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). The Supreme Court established in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969), that § 8(c) was enacted to "implement the First Amendment." For
a comprehensive analysis of § 8(c) as it effects all areas of employer speech in the workplace,
see Shaffer, Some Gray Areas of Employer Free Speech, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 39 (1972-73).
2. Section 7 provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization in section 158(a)(3) of this
title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
3. Indiana Cabinet Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1009 (1985),
Rossmore House, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984), enforced, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local I I v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985); W
& F Bldg. Maintenance Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 849, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1125 (1984).
4. For a history of the Board's response to the enactment of Sec. 8(c), see Comment,
Labor Law Reform: The Requlation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979).
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the constitutional and statutory recognition of an employer's right to
freely communicate with employees so long as the communication is
noncoercive, and the Board's concern with enforcing the mandate of
section 8(a)(1 ).5 The Board's previous efforts to reconcile this conflict by restricting employer communications have resulted in conflict
in Board decisions and a general repression of employer speech.6 The
recent decisions, however, suggest that the Board, with court approval, is discarding its sometimes paternalistic role as protector of
helpless employees incapable of evaluating any communication from
the employer, and permitting the "give and take" exchange of views
which is the heart of first amendment protection. 7
I.

ROSSMORE

HOUSE, INC. AND

EMPLOYER INTERROGATION OF
EMPLOYEES

Despite statutory and judicial authority to the contrary, the
Board's position for a number of years has been that any interrogation of an employee by an employer is a per se violation of the Act.8
In Rossmore House, Inc.,9 the Board held that a manager's interro5. Section 8(a)(1) provides as follows: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
In Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: the Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43
MD. L. REv. 4 (1984), he notes that the restriction of employer (and union) free speech is
contrary to the usual enforcement of first amendment privileges, which is based on a recognition of "the value of diversity of expression and the ability of the hearer, as consumer, to make
an intelligent choice." Id. at 12. Instead, in regard to labor relations, the courts have adopted a
stance which "rests ultimately on the assumption that free choice is fragile-that it will be
undermined by the type of robust debate encouraged by the first amendment in other areas."
Id.
6. "Labor relations is the one area of law in which the policies of the first amendment
have been consistently ignored, reduced, and held to be outweighed by other interests."
Getman, supra note 5, at 4. Getman also discussed the areas, particularly picketing and boycotting, in which first amendment rights of unions have been restricted.
7. Getman notes that the cases limiting employer speech "manifest a common, stereotyped, and paternalistic vision of workers as people whose decisions are not made on the basis
of ideas and persuasion but on the basis of fear, coercion and discipline." Getman, supra note
5, at 19-20. The Board has at times recognized that the paternalistic role is not necessarily
desirable. See, e.g., Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 515, 520, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1005 (1982) ("[I]t does a disservice to. . .employees to suggest that they [are] incapable of
assessing for themselves the validity of their employer's remarks . . ...
"). Id.

8. E.g., Anaconda Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1094, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1070, 1094
(1979) (casual questioning of employees who were union members by supervisors who knew
them by their first names violated the act); Paceco, 237 N.L.R.B. 399, 399, 99 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1544, 1545 (1978), vacated in part and remanded in part, 601 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.
1979), supplement decision, 247 N.L.R.B. 1405, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1327 (1980) (asking
an employee why he supports the union is coercive even if no threats are made).
9. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984).
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gation of an employee was not an 8(a)(1) violation per se, but that
"all the circumstances" should be examined to determine if the interrogation tended to "restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act."' 10 The Administrative Law Judge in Rossmore
House found that both the manager and the owner had unlawfully
interrogated the employee in violation of section 8(a)(1)."1 The
Judge relied on the rule of PPG Industries,2 in which the Board
held that "an employer may [not] lawfully initiate questioning about
employees' union sentiments [even] where the employees are open
and known union supporters and the inquiries are unaccompanied by
threats or promises."' 13 The Board reversed the Judge and overruled
the PPG Industries line of cases at least in regard to open and active
union supporters. At the same time, the Board indicated that it was
readopting the "all the circumstances" test previously asserted in
Blue Flash Express, Inc.14 which had been abandoned in PPG.
Despite its rejection of the per se rule of PPG Industries, the
Board's holding in Rossmore House continues to restrict an employer's statutory and first amendment rights to communicate to employees by instituting an "all the circumstances" test only when the
employer's interrogation is directed at known union supporters. The
Board's own stated rationale for its decision in Rossmore House does
not require so restrictive a holding. The Rossmore House Board relied in part on the Third Circuit's approach in Graham Architectural Products v. NLRB,' 5 in which the court emphasized the need
to recognize an employer's first amendment right to communicate
with employees before assessing the nature of the employer's speech
10.

269 N.R.B. at 1177, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1026. In Rossmore House, the em-

ployer's manager asked one of the employees, a known union supporter, about possible unionization and told the employee that both he and the owner would fight the union "to the hilt."
Id. at 1176-77, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1025-26.
11. Id. at 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1025.
12. 251 N.L.R.B. 1146, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1434 (1980).
13. Id. at 1147, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1436.
14. 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1384 (1954).
15. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1177, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1026 (1984), quoting Graham Architectural Products v. N.L.R.B., 697 F.2d 534, 541 (3d Cir. 1983). The Graham

court noted that:
Because production Supervisors and employees often work closely together, one can
expect that during the course of the workday they will discuss a range of subjects of
mutual interest, including ongoing unionization efforts. To hold that any instance of
casual questioning concerning ongoing union sympathies violates the Act ignores the
realities of the workplace. Moreover, . . . [i]f section 8(a)(1) of the Act deprived
the employers of any right to ask non-coercive questions of their employees during
such a campaign, the Act would directly collide with the Constitution.
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in light of section 8(a)(1).' 6 Nothing in Graham ArchitecturalProducts suggests that the distinction between permissible and impermis-

sible questioning of employees is to be determined simply on the
known union sentiments of the interrogee. Instead, the Third Circuit
endorsed a definition of permissible interrogation fully in line with
the constitutional basis of section 8(c). 17 Furthermore, when the
Ninth Circuit enforced Rossmore House,1 8 it did not enforce the
narrow rule espoused by the Board. 9 Instead, the court enforced the
"all-the-circumstances" test,2 0 newly resurrected but not completely

implemented by the Board, which the Ninth Circuit had for the
most part upheld since the days of Blue Flash Express.2
Despite the clear indication by the Third and Ninth Circuits
that an employer's freedom of speech should be restricted only if the
speech violates section 8(a)(1), the narrow ruling of Rossmore
House has been upheld in subsequent Board cases involving interrogation of employees whose union sentiments are unknown. 22 In these
16. Graham Architectural Prods., 697 F.2d at 541.
17. Id. Such questioning is not a per se violation which would ignore the employer's first
amendment right, but is illegal only when it is actually coercive.
18. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984), enforced, Hotel Employees
& Restaurant Employees Local I I v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
19. 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The Board ruled that only when the employee was a
known union supporter, was the employer's interrogation of an employee not a per se violation
of the Act.
20. We conclude that the Board acted within its province in returning to the flexible all-the-circumstances test which recognizes that an employer's questioning of an
employee's union views is not necessarily coercive and may arise during casual conversation. Employers often mingle with their employees, and union activities are a
natural topic of conversation. A standard which considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding an employee interrogation is a realistic approach to the enforcement of section 8(a)(l). It is a standard that is consistent with the Act because the
Board and the administrative law judges can determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether all the fact demonstrate coercive behavior.
Id at 1009.
21. See NLRB v. Brooks Camera, 691 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1982) (supervisor did not
violate Act by stating that he had heard employees wanted a union, that he knew who the
instigator was, and asking what the employees' grievances were); Lippincott Indus. v. NLRB,
661 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Interrogation of employees is an unfair labor practice
when, under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere
with the employees in the exercise of their free rights") (emphasis added); Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080, (9th Cir. 1977) ("Employer interrogation . . . is
not deemed per se unlawful . . . . Some circumstances, such as, for example, an express reassurance by the employer of no retaliation or a history of free and open discussion of union
activities, may preclude any possibility of coerciveness.").
22. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 2 at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1347,
1348 (1985) (a nonthreatening statement of a supervisor to an open and active union supporter
was noncoercive); Meadow Crest, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 2, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1484, 1485 (1984) (interrogation was unlawful because employee was not open and active
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cases, the Board has found that the mere questioning of an employee
whose union sentiments were unknown to the interrogator was suffi-

cient to result in an 8(a)(1) violation, without an examination of all
the circumstances to determine whether the interrogation was, in
fact, coercive or threatening.23 Instead, the Rossmore House deci-

sion created a two-part test which looks to the identity of the inter24
rogee rather than to the nature of the speech itself.

The statutory and constitutional bases of an employer's right to
free speech, as well as judicial opinion and logic, clearly mandate
that the Board should abandon the first part of this test and adhere

solely to the second step, inquiring into the known sympathies of the
employee only as part of a case by case examination of all the circumstances regarding the legality of employer interrogations. This
approach to employer interrogation is evidenced in a recent case,

Michael's Markets of Canterbury,5 in which the Board found that
an employer's direct inquiry as to which employees were former

union members did not constitute impermissible interrogation. Despite the fact that the employer's president was at the meeting and

no assurances against reprisals were given, the majority determined
that the management consultant who asked the question "was
merely trying to show that having union representation would pro-

vide no guarantee of job security as evidenced by the number of former union members who had lost their union jobs. '26 Based on all
the circumstances surrounding the question, the panel majority determined that the interrogation was non-coercive despite the presunion supporter); Premier Rubber Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 76 at 7, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1406, 1406 (1984) (innocent questioning of a known union supporter was not a violation of
§ 8(a)()).
23. Chairman Dotson has on more than one occasion protested against the Board's reluctance to fully enforce the "all-the-circumstances" test reaffirmed in Rossmore House. For
example, in N & T Assoc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1517 (1984), Chairman Dotson believed his colleagues were construing Rossmore House too narrowly. In that
case, assuming that the interrogee was not an "open union supporter," the Board should still
have assessed "all the circumstances" in determining whether or not the questioning "reasonably tends to interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act." Id. at 4 n.8, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 1518 n.8. Chairman Dotson found that the question asked of the interrogee did not restrain,
coerce or interfere with the employee's rights. Id.
24. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1176-77, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1026. Part I of the new
test inquires into the known union sympathies of the interrogee. If an employee's union sentiments are unknown to the employer, any interrogation of the employee by the employer is a
per se violation of § 8(a)(l). If the interrogee is a known union supporter, only then is the
question asked whether, under all the circumstances, the interrogation tends to coerce,
threaten or unduly promise benefits to the employee.
25. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1476 (1985) (Chairman Dotson and
Member Hunter comprising the majority and Member Dennis dissenting in relevant part).
26. Id. at 6, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1478.
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ence of employees whose union sentiments were unknown to the
7
employer.1

II.

W & F BUILDING MAINTENANCE CO. AND EMPLOYER
EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION

Section 8(c) expressly deals with an employer's first amendment
right to express his opinion, views, or arguments. 28 The test for impermissible opinion speech is to determine whether or not the employer communication contains a threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit.29 The Board has in the past few years condoned a wide variety of isolated negative remarks by supervisors indicating their negative opinion of unions.30 All of these communications, however, oc27. The Board also found no violation in regard to letters which were distributed to
employees blaming unionization for the decline in working conditions at the writer's previous
place of business. The Board held that "[t]he exercise of free speech in these campaigns should
not be unduly restricted by narrow construction. . . .Merely apprising employees of the experiences and opinions of others is in no way a prediction or threat of retaliatory conduct by an
employer." Id. -at 3, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1477.
28. See supra note 1.
29. Id.
30. E.g., Haynes Motor Lines, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 221 at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1351, 1351 (1985) (terminal manager's comments that "he was a company man and did not
want the Union" and that "it would be fine if the employees wanted the Union, but they
should not follow [a co-worker] as a leader because he was organizing the Union out of revenge because the Company did not give him a salesman's job," was found protected by
§ 8(c)); Ralph's Toys, Hobbies, Cards & Gifts, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 36 at 10, 117
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1260, 1261 (1984) (manager was merely stating his displeasure and did not
violate § 8(a)(1) when he told them, "It's too bad you guys had to start all this shit; we had a
good thing going"); Greensboro News Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 1-2 n.2, 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1290, 1291 (1984) (a manager's statement that employer and "employees could not
just sit and talk about financial or family problems if we had a union, that everything would
just have to go through proper channels" did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act); AgriInternational, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 925, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (1984) (employer's
plea to employees to "'see this situation through without a union' in order to provide [the
employer] 'a chance to succeed and you won't be sorry'" was protected free speech and did
not violate § 8(a)(l)); Gerber Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1235 n.3, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1274, 1275
(1984) (Company's statement that "it could guarantee employees work for 52 weeks" was not
viewed as a promise of benefits to the employees as opposed to what the union could offer
them); Peck, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 451, 456, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1204, 1205 (1984) (memorandum read to employees by president stating that union membership could be dangerous and
might subject the employees to "dues, fees, fines" and other financial obligations was not sufficiently coercive or restraining to violate § 8(a)(l); Mid-South Refrigerated Warehouse Co.,
268 N.L.R.B. 1229, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1305 (1984) (no violation of section 8(a)(1) where
supervisor called each employee into his office to advise him individually of a pay raise and
told two of them that he hoped that they would "be for the Company" and "stay away" from
the union); Fisher-Haynes Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1274 n.2, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1432,
1432 (1982) (vice president's remarks of "shock and disappointment" upon learning that employees were involved in the union did not violate the employees' rights); Burlington Indus.,
257 N.L.R.B. 712, 722, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1598, 1602 (1981), enforced in relevant part,
680 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1982) (a supervisor's statement to an employee that "the Union is
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curred during pre-election campaigns."
In W & F Building Maintenance Co.,32 the Board confronted

the question of an employer's right to express its opinion regarding
an incumbent union. In that case, in response to an employee's in-

quiry, a supervisor told the employee and his co-worker that unions
were a waste of money, that the employees' security lay in doing

good work and that even the union could not keep them from getting
fired if their work was unsatisfactory. The Board upheld the Judge's
ruling that such unfavorable personal opinions did not violate section
8(a)(1) in the absence of unfair labor practices.
The Board is yet to consider a case in which an employer offers
a negative opinion of an incumbent union to employees, which opinion is neither the personal opinion of a supervisor nor isolated. For
example, no Board decision has condoned the practice of a unionized
employer who systematically tells each new employee that, in the

employer's opinion, the union is a waste of the employee's money,
the employee does not need the union to get ahead in the company,

and that the employee's advancement depends on his job performance and not on the union.
There is Board precedent in pre-election campaign cases for
such formal exercise of the employer's right to offer its opinion.33 In
going to brainwash you" was only an expression of opinion and not a violation). Compare
Peabody Coal Co. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 1984) (a supervisor's statements,
although jocular in nature, violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act because they hinted that the
employees' jobs or seniority would be jeopardized if the union won. "After warning of the
possible consequences of unionization . . . he went on to inquire whether [the employee] had
signed a union authorization card and to ask what it was that [the employee] expected to gain
from union membership." Id. at 361).
31. For a history of the efforts of the Board and courts to balance the employer's right
to free speech and the employee's right to organize, see Comment, Employer Free Speech:
Threats, Opinions, Predictionsof Dire Consequences-the Advent of a Clearer Standard,18
S.D.L. REV. 441 (1973). This comment examines the cases and conflicts which gave rise to
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), establishing the test still used to determine
the lawfulness of employer pre-election campaign communication. For an examination of the
Gissel standard in relation to pre-election campaign predictions by an employer, see Note,
Employer Free Speech-Use of the Gissel Guidelines in DeterminingPredictions or Threats,
74 W. VA. L. REV. 382 (1972).
32. 268 N.L.R.B. 849, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1125 (1984).
33. See cases cited supra note 30. Board opinions regarding "serious harm" communications by employees in pre-election campaigns also indicate that pro-company speech is not a
per se violation of the Act. See, e.g., Butler Shoes New York, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1032,
117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225, 1226 (1982) (employer speeches including the statements
"[Please don't] let someone else decide your future" and "I personally feel that, as of right
now, you have a good job and a good place to work" found not in violation of Act); Hasbro
Indus., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 587, 592-93, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1131, 1132 (1981), enforced in
relevant part, 672 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982) (a document stating, inter alia, that "NO UNION
can get you more than you can get for yourself" and "NO UNION can get for you more than
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these pre-election cases, the Board appears to look at the context of

the employer's speech, a test fully in keeping with the Ninth Circuit
34
test in Rossmore House, Inc. and the language of section 8(c).
If the content of a unionized employer's communication to new
employees stays within the confines of noncoercive speech, the sys-

tematic nature of the communication should not violate section
8(a)(1), as systematic pro-company indoctrination of employees dur-

ing a union organizing campaign has been held not to be a per se
violation of section 8(a)(1). For example, in A & E Stores, Inc. 35 ,
the Board found no violation of section 8(a)(1) even though the em-

ployer maintained a practice of meeting with employees throughout
the campaign regarding the employer's position on organization.3 6

The Judge held that the communication neither made apparent the
employer's desire as to how individual employees should vote nor indicated employer displeasure at employee support for the Union. The
Board upheld the Judge's decision, finding that while the employer's
actions might in some cases amount to coercion, they did not estab37
lish coercion per se.
The pre-election campaign cases clearly establish the policy that
systematic pro-company speech to employees should be permitted so
long as it is not coercive or threatening and does not interfere with
the Company is willing to give" not unlawful). Compare Pacific Tel. Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 449,
107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269 (1981) (Board found employer's communication that nonunion
employees received equal benefits without paying union dues was an interference with the
election).
34. A test which examines the context of a speech rather than turning solely on an often
hair-splitting interpretation of semantics, is the key to a proper determination of the validity of
pre-election campaign communications. Shaffer, supra note 1, at 51. To fail to examine the
context of a speech has resulted in decisions which "draw the line far short of the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech." Id. at 48. "[I]n the face of a union campaign, the
employer is not required to remain silent, but may pursue his position with the same aggressiveness and vigor as the union, provided he refrains from threats, coercion and promises." Id.
The same considerations are equally applicable to both employer and union efforts to assert
their positions after a union has won the election.
35. 272 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393 (1984).
36. Id. at 3, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1394. Approximately two or three times a week
the supervisors would hold conferences with their employees, during which they would discuss
with the employees literature explaining the employer's belief that employees should not joined
the union. Although the Judge found that at least one of the employees felt "harassed" by the
meetings with the employer, the harassment consisted only of her annoyance at being called to
the meetings and did not amount to harassment perpetrated by the employer to impede her
free exercise of her rights. Id. at 13-14, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1396.
37. Id. at 3-4, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1394. Cf., Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109
N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954). ("[T]he fact that . . . interrogation is systematic
does not, in itself, impart a coercive character to the interrogation." Id. at 593, 34 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1385.
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the employees' right to unionize. 3 Section 8(c) alone is sufficient to

provide the basis for permitting non-coercive speech to new employees in which the employer expresses its opinion that the new employees do not need the union to have successful careers, if the employer
makes no attempt to keep ,the employee out of the union and takes

no reprisal if the employee does join the union.3 9 The Board has ample opportunity to find such speech permissible when this issue is
presented to it in the future.
III.

INDIANA CABINET Co. AND EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO INITIATE
THE IDEA OF DECERTIFYING A UNION

The Board's position regarding an employer's conduct in regard

to decertification petitions is broadly stated. The conduct is permissi-

ble as along as "the preparation, circulation, and signing of the petition constituted the free and uncoerced act of the employees con-

cerned." 40 This rule, however, has been interpreted not only to
prohibit employer initiation of a decertification petition, but to forbid
even the suggestion by an employer that such a petition be circulated. 4 1 In short, for an employer to volunteer the suggestion of a
decertification petition was per se to coerce the employees. For example, in Craftool Manufacturing Co., 2 the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by its sponsorship of a decertification petition when one
38. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 405, 33 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1156,
1157 (1953), in which the Board found that "[a] basic principle directly affecting any consideration of this question is that section 8(c) of the Act specifically prohibits us from finding that
an uncoercive speech, whenever delivered by the employer, constitutes an unfair labor practice." (emphasis added).
39. "The very essence of Section 8(c) is that the employer has the right to present his
side of the question to his employees." Shaffer, supra note 1, at 42.
40. Eastern States Optical Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 5, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1107,
1109 (1985) (quoting KONO-TV Mission Telecasting, 163 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006, 65
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1082 (1967)); accord, University of Richmond, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 182 at 2,
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1579 (1985) ("[A]n employer may lawfully assist employees in the
revocation of their authorization cards when employees initiate the idea of withdrawal and
have the opportunity to continue or stop the revocation process without the interference or
knowledge of the employer." (footnote omitted)); Best Western Executive Inn, 272 N.L.R.B.
No. 202, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1487 (1984) (the Board found no violation when the employees requested help with decertification, even though the company's lawyer met with the employees in a meeting room provided by the employer free of charge); Quinn Co., 273 N.L.R.B.
No. 107, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1239 (1984) ("an employer does not violate the Act by providing accurate information regarding the mechanics of decertification, in response to questions
from its employees").
41. The Board's narrow interpretation of an employer's rights in regard to decertification petitions, has been colorfully characterized as follows: "For many years, management
executives were careful to whisper when discussing decertification." Krupman and Rasin,
Decertification:Removing the Shroud, 30 LAB. L.J. 231 (1979).
42. 229 N.L.R.B. 634, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1126 (1977).
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of its high management officials initiated the suggestion of circulating a petition. Although in this case the employer also encouraged
employee signatures and engaged in other conduct to assist the
decertification procedure, the Administrative Law Judge appears to
have found the employer's initiation of the idea significant.43
More recently, the Board in Weisser Optical Co.44 found that
an employer violated the Act by implanting the idea of decertification in the employees' minds when it requested one of its employees
to sponsor a decertification effort and gave him a booklet explaining
the Board's decertification procedure. 45 Because the idea of decertification originated with the employer, the Board found that the employer could not rely on a petition signed by 18 of 22 bargaining unit
employees to justify a refusal to bargain.46
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc.,4 the
Board adopted the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge who
squarely confronted the question of whether the mere mention of
decertification by an employer, without more, is sufficient to violate
the Act. During the 90 to 60 day period in which a decertification
petition could be filed with the Board prior to the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the employer's operations manager
asked one of the employees if he had thought about decertifying the
union, and briefly explained what decertification might mean to the
employees. The Judge determined, without analysis of the employer's
8(c) right, that the unsolicited discussion of decertification violated
section 8(a)(1) because the circumstances "convey[ed] the implication that the employer was using his leverage to influence the employee on a question of union representation." 4 a
In a second incident in the same case, another supervisor, in
response to an employee's question regarding the company's poor
competitive position, stated that he disfavored dealing with the
Union and suggested that the employees contact the Board if they
had considered decertifying the union.49 The Judge, not surprisingly,
43. Id. at 636, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1126.
44. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1564 (1985).
45. The employer requested that the employee return the booklet before he had taken
any action; however, the employee made a photocopy of the sample "evidence-of-interest" language which he then used to solicit signatures on a petition. Id. at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1565.
46. Id. at 1, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1565.
47. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1123 (1985).
48. Id. at 5, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1123. The test employed by the ALJ was the "all-

the-circumstances" test appropriate for any determination of whether an employer has violated

§

8(a)(l) or merely exercised its right to free speech. Id.

49.

Id. at 7, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1123. The supervisor had made a similar statement
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given the innocuous circumstances of the exchange, did not find that
the supervisor's statements were coercive. He held instead that the
employer's suggestion violated the Act by leading the employees to
believe their continued support of the Union was futile. 50 The
Judge's justification for this holding is instructive:
It is clear that Medrick [the supervisor] was very troubled by BFI's
wage scale, which he laid at the Union's door. Getting rid of both
these wage scales and their cause-the Union-was at the top of
his list. With one-half of the open period remaining in which to
decertif[y] the Union, it was too tempting not to suggest it without
being too pushy, which Medrick was wise enough to know could
backfire. His hope was that there was enough griping about the
Union in the shop that his idea would bear fruit. Medrick's statements tended to interfere with employees' Section 7 rights, and,
hence, are violat[ive] of section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 '
The Judge's ruling and rationale overlook the obvious implication that section 8(c) would be unnecessary if employers only made
statements indicating that they favored unions and wanted their employees to belong to one. The provision assumes that any employer
statement needing the provision's protection would necessarily be one
which the employer hoped would "bear fruit" in the form of dissuading employee support of the union. Consequently, an employer's desire not to have a union is insufficient to constitute interference or
coercion, and a per se rule based solely on such dislike, absent other
coercive factors, is a misreading of section 8(a) (1).52 Second, the per
se rule overlooks the fact that unions may in some cases not be likely
to inform employees of their right to decertify.5 3 Hence, employer
information to that effect merely informs the employees of a statutory right of which they may otherwise remain ignorant. 4 Finally, it
is unlikely that an employee's mere knowledge of his statutory rights
during a meeting with union stewards.
50. Id. at I n.l, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1123 n.l.
51. Id. at 8, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1123 (footnote omitted).
52. "An employer is not required to favor unions or even have a neutral attitude toward
them in order for his speech to be protected under 8(c)." Shaffer, supra note 1, at 59.
53. The need for lawful participation by employers in decertification cases is discussed
by Krupman and Rasin, supra note 41, at 233. These authors point out that, "[clertainly an
incumbent union will not provide disgruntled employees with any assistance. In fact, Board
decisions have upheld union expulsion of members who initiate decertification proceedings."
Id. See also Shaffer, supra note 1, at 56, who notes that "[o]ne would not expect the union to
tell the employees of any adverse consequences of union adherence, and there should be nothing wrong with the employers doing so." Id.
54. To deny employers the right to inform their employees of their statutory rights "assumes employee ignorance which it is unlawful to correct." Getman, supra note 5, at 10.
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will cause him to feel that union participation is futile simply because such knowledge came from the employer. In any event, such
risks are inherent when both sides in a dispute have first amendment
rights.
The Board's position defining employer initiation of a decertification petition presented a contrast to its longstanding rule that an
employer can permissibly bring to the employees' attention their
right to resign from a union and to revoke their dues checkoff authorizations "so long as the communication is free from any threat or
coercion. '55 The seminal Board cases on an employer's right to give
information to employees are Perkins Machine Co.,5 8 and Cyclops
Corp. 7 In Perkins the employer sent each employee a letter informing him of the fifteen-day "escape" period provided in the contract.
The letter also contained assurances that the company did not care if
the employee acted on the information, and the anonymous delivery
of the information precluded the employer from determining if any
employee used the enclosed revocation forms. The Board found that
absent other evidence of coercion, the communication did not violate
section 8(a)(1). 58 Most important for later cases was the fact that
the information sent by the company had not been requested by any
employee.
In Cyclops, the employees asked the manager of industrial relations how to withdraw their union dues checkoff authorizations. Subsequently, the employer enclosed this information as well as the employee's anniversary date for calculating the escape period in each
employee's paycheck. The Board found no violation of section
8(a)(1) despite its acknowledgement that "any notification by a
company to its employees of their right to withdraw from a union
carries with it at least the notion that the company 'wants' the employees to withdraw." 59 Even in the absence of specific assurances
that no reprisals would be taken against the employees if they did
not resign, the distributed information was found not to be
'60
threatening.
A recent case from the Board reaffirmed the principles of Perkins and Cyclops, suggesting that the Board was in a position to re55.

Landmark Int'l Trucks, Inc., v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 815, 820 (6th Cir. 1983).

56. 141 N.L.R.B. 697, 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1276 (1963), enforced, 326 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1964).
57. 216 N.L.R.B. 857, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1499 (1975).

58.

Perkins, 141 N.L.R.B. at 700, 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1276.

59.

Cyclops, 216 N.L.R.B. at 858-59, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1501.

60.

Id. at 858, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1500.
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examine an employer's freedom to communicate noncoercively statutory rights to employees. In Peoples Gas Systems, Inc.,61 the employer sent the employees at one of its facilities a letter informing
them of the terms and effective dates of the dues checkoff provision

contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 62 The Board held
that the employer's letter did not violate the Act, citing the rule of

Cyclops and Perkins. The Board stressed that an employer could distribute this information on its own initiative, based on the employee's
rights embodied in section 7 of the Act, absent circumstances sug-

gesting coercion, intimidation or anti-union animus.6 a
In light of the Board's new willingness to expand employer

rights to free speech in the workplace, it could be anticipated that
the Board would break from the per se rule prohibiting an employer

from informing employees that the union could be decertified. The
basis for such a decision was clearly available in previous Board decisions; there is little distinction between an employer's Cyclops/Perkins rights and the right to inform employees that they can decertify
a union. In addition to employees' general right to be informed of

their rights under section 7, section 8(c) at the least permits an employer to publish to employees, in a non-coercive, non-threatening

manner, the contents of the labor relations statutes.6 4 Furthermore,
there seems to be no reason to permit employers to engage in non-

coercive communications to employees prior to elections but prohibit
them from communicating statutory rights to employees after union-

ization. If anything, an employer's speech, if it is to be censored at
all, should be more restricted before an election. During that time
the Board seeks to preserve the "laboratory conditions" 6 5 conducive
61. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149 (1985).
62. The employer's letter included a copy of a letter for the employees to send to the
union discontinuing their dues checkoff authorization cards and submitting their resignation.
The employer's letter requested the employees to mail a copy of this letter to the employer.
The employer's letter contained assurances that the employee's decision to revoke their dues
checkoff authorizations and to resign from the union was a matter of personal choice, free of
company or union pressure. Id. at 4-6, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1150.
63. Id. at 11, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1151-52.
64. See supra note 1.
65. The "laboratory conditions test" was formulated by the Board in General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1337 (1948), as follows:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible,
to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish
these conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled.
When . . .the requisite laboratory conditions are not present . . . the experiment
must be conducted over again.
Id. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1341; accord Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50
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to providing a free and uncoerced choice to employees. After an election the union has been established as the employees' bargaining representative and must be dealt with by the employer. 6
The Board finally broke with the past in Indiana Cabinet Co.,67
in which the panel majority ruled in effect that employer initiation of
the idea of decertification was no longer a per se violation of the Act.
In this case, a supervisor approached two newly hired employees and
stated that he had heard that they "were not satisfied with the
Union, and advised them [that] they could file a decertification petition but the Company could not assist them." 8 The majority found
no violation, 9 on the basis that the supervisor's statement was not a
request that the employees initiate a decertification petition, and the
statement occurred in a context free of employer unfair labor practices. The majority opinion cited to R.L. White Co., Inc.,70 which
espoused the Perkins/Cyclopsrule that employers could lawfully inform employees of their rights to revoke their dues checkoff authorization cards."' The majority noted that the supervisor in Indiana
Cabinet Co. did not attempt to learn whether the employees started
an anti-union petition before specifically informing them that the
company could not help them if they started one. The Board thus
moved from its previous position prohibiting an employer from communicating statutory rights to its employees to a new rule that the
employer can on its own initiative tell employees that they can decertify the union if the atmosphere is free of employer unfair labor
practices and the employer refrains from any action compelling the
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1152 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1963).
66. Cf., Nestle Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1368, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1007 (1984) (potentially

coercive speech by an employer is not a violation of the Act where a supervisor made remarks
in the non-coercive atmosphere of a grievance meeting and in the context of a 40-year old
bargaining relationship); Federal Management Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 107, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA)

1296 (1982) (employer's remark that he did not want any "fucking" union telling him how to
run its business did not violate section 8(a)(1) by constituting anticipatory refusal to bargain
when union was already in place and bargaining was underway).
67. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1009 (1985), Member Dennis dissenting in relevant part.
68. Id. at 9, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1013.

69. The Board majority noted specifically that "we do not believe that [the supervisor's]
mere informing of [the employees] about the procedure by which a union [decertification]

could be circulated created a situation in which [they] would tend to feel peril if they refrained
from circulating such a petition." Id. at 4, 220 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1012.
70. 262 N.L.R.B. 575, 111L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1078 (1982).
71. Accord Ace Hardware Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1096
(1984); Mariposa Press, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1266 (1984); Cf. Foothills Food, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. !1,118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1118 (1984) (circumstances
were not those in which an employee would feel free to refrain from revocation process).
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employees to actually sponsor such a petition.72
IV.

CONCLUSION

Section 8(c) was passed by Congress to ensure an employer's
first amendment right to disseminate its views, opinions and arguments in a noncoercive manner to its employees, not only during an
election campaign, but after a union is in place. The cases discussed

74
above, Rossmore House, Inc.,73 W & F Building Maintenance Co.,
and Indiana Cabinet Co.,7 5 indicate a move by the Board toward a
more realistic view of the workplace. Rossmore House, Inc.7 1 is a
step in the right direction, based on the fact that supervisors and
employees will, in the course of the workday, exchange questions and
information regarding an election campaign. Nevertheless, section
8(c) should permit non-coercive, non-threatening inquiries regarding
unionization even in regard to known union supporters. And while W
& F Building Maintenance Co.7 permits non-coercive negative opinions to be expressed by supervisors in isolated remarks about an incumbent union, the Board should rely on its own precedent, as well
as on section 8(c), to permit an employer to give its opinion frankly
to each new employee regarding what the employer feels the company can do for the employee without the union. Finally, the Board
has held in Indiana Cabinet Co. 7 1 that an employer may inform employees of their right to decertify a union, bringing this area of employer communication in line with previous law permitting employers
to inform employees of their statutory rights. These cases are examples of the Board's proper performance of its function of enforcing
section 8(a)(1) without assuming an unwarranted role as arbitrary
censor of free speech in the workplace.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Indiana Cabinet at 4, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1012.
269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984).
268 N.L.R.B. 849, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1125 (1984).
275 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1009 (1985).

76. See supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
77.

See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.

78. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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